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COMMENTS
CUSTOMS DUTIES: TOWARD A LESS RESTRICTIVE DEFINITION OF
"WASTE"
Studner v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 1394 (Cust. Ct. 1969).
Plaintiff imported old printing blocks, unusable for printing but sold
and used in their imported condition as wall decorations. The Customs
Collector sought an import duty of 40 per centum ad valorem, as
"print blocks or print rollers, not specially provided for, of whatever
material composed, used for printing, stamping, or cutting designs."'
Plaintiff-importer sued to change the classification of the print blocks
to "waste, not specially provided for," which was subject to the lower
import duty of 4 per centum ad valorem A divided Customs Court
approved the requested change in classification. Held: old or used print
blocks, incapable of use-without remanufacture-for their original
purpose of printing but sold and used in their imported condition as
wall decorations, are waste under the Tariff Act of 1930
In finding that the printing blocks were "waste", the Studner
majority reasoned exclusively from the 1926 Customs Court's
definition in Harley Co. v. United States! Harley established two types
of waste: articles which had become "useless for the original purpose
for which they were made and fit only for remanufacture into
something else," 5 known as "old waste", and by-products' of a
I. TARIFF AcT OF 1930 395, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1202 (1964), as modified by T.D. 51802, 82
Treas. Dec. 305 (1947). On protest, defendant admitted this classification to be erroneous and
appeared willing to accept a 19% duty-applicable to "articles, whether partially or wholly
manufactured, composed wholly or in chief value of base metal," TARIFF ACT OF 1930 397,
19 U.S.C.A. § 1202 (1964), as modified by T.D. 54108, 91 Treas. Dec. 150 (1956)-which was
claimed by plaintiff in the alternative. In this manner, the issue narrowed to a consideration of
waste. Studner v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 1394, 1396 (Cust. Ct. 1969).
2. TARIFF ACT OF 1930 1555, as modified by T.D. 52739, 86 Treas. Dec. 121 (195 1).
3. Studner v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 1394 (Cust. Ct. 1969). Contra, Downing v. United
States, 122 F. 445 (2d Cir. 1903). In this early case involving cannon which were useless as
artillery but salable as relics and souvenirs, the Court of Customs Appeals did not cite the then-
controlling Patton definition of waste, but decided that the cannon were not free of duty as "old
brass" or "composition metal" basing its decision on general principles and statutory
interpretation.
4. 14 Ct. Cust. App. 112, 115, T.D. 41644 (1926).
5. Id. (emphasis added).
6. Id. The court referred to "refuse, surplus and useless stuff resulting from manufacture or
manufacturing processes." However, in subsequent discussions of the "new waste" category, the
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manufacturing process-such as tangled spun thread, coat dust, broken
or spoiled castings-"commercially unfit, without remanufacture, for
purposes for which the original material was suitable. . . ."7 known-
as "new waste."
The Studner majority recognized that the old printing blocks were
fit for use without remanufacture, and that they were not byproducts.
Old printing blocks then, failed to meet the exact requirements of the
Harley definition. The Studner court, however, to avoid an "illogical"
holding," departed from the Harley definition. It first determined that
old printing blocks were no longer suitable for their original purpose.
It then examined a series of cases involving "new waste" articles for
which prior Customs Courts had required no fitness for remanufacture.
Instead, the articles were classified as new waste even though usable in
their imported condition without further remanufacture? Finding no
judicial requirement for "fitness for remanufacture" in these "new
waste" cases and examining two "old waste" cases which
circumvented the fitness for remanufacture requirement, 0 the court
reasoned that "old waste" articles could remain in the 4% waste
classification even though the articles might be used for another
purpose without remanufacture. To bolster this position, the majority
cited sections of the Tariff Act which contained specific language
limiting the term "waste" or "scrap" to merchandise fit only for
remanufacture." Since the provisions for "waste, not specially
phrase has become synonymous with "by-products". See, e.g., Summary of Tariff Information,
1948, Vol 15, part 9, at 136, as quoted in Studner v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 1394 (Cust.
Ct 1969)
7 Harley Co. v. United States, 14 Ct. Cust. App. 112, 115, T.D. 41644 (1926) (emphasis
added)
8 Studner v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 1394, 1398 (Cust. Ct. 1969).
9 Id at 1397; Cia. Algondonera v. United States, 23 C.C.P.A. 42, T.D. 47686 (1935)
(Cottonseed hulls-which were a necessary by-product in the course of the manufacture of
cottonseed oil and meal were not further manufactured but were mixed with meal in small
percentages and fed to cattle); National Carloading Corp. v. United States, 22 Cust. Ct. 328,
Abstract 53220 (1949) (Pieces of sisal fiber which fell off in the process of manufacturing and
were unsuitable for use in manufacturing shoes, bags, or brushes, used in their imported condition
as stuffing for furniture, mattresses, and the like.); W.R. Grace & Co. v. United States, 9 Cust.
Ct 59, T D. 662 (1942) (a by-product obtained as a result of manufacturing buttons from tagua
nuts, used as a filler in explosives); Koons, Wilson & Co. v. United States, 12 Ct. Cust. App.
418 (1924) (beet pulp-the dried residue from sugar beets after extraction of sugar-used for
cattle feed)
10 P. Silverman & Son v. United States, 27 C.C.P.A. 324, C.A.D. 107 (1940) (worn-out
sanfortzing blankets); Rachman Bag Co., Inc. v. United States, 57 Cust. Ct. 46, C.D. 2838 (1966)
(slit burlap bags).
I I The provision for waste, not specially provided for, in paragraph 1555 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, is without other limitation. It does not contain a proviso, such as that in
Vol. 1970: 198]
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provided for" contained no such limitation, the Studner court found
no Congressional intent to take "old waste" merchandise out of the
waste classification merely because it could be used for another purpose
without remanufacture.
The dissent pointed out an additional statement of the Harley court,
that a manufactured article "which, without further remanufacture,
has a valuable practical use, is not waste or old junk.' ' 2 Since these
print blocks had an intrinsic commercial value without remanufacture,
the dissent suggested that they did not conform to the meaning of the
term waste and should not be dutiable at 4%. Because the Tariff Act
of 1930 reenacted the provisions for "waste, not specially provided
for" without change, the dissent further argued that Congress had
adopted the 1926 Harley requirement that a "waste" article be "fit
only for remanufacture into something else."' 13
Historically, the tariff problem concerning waste which faced the
courts seems to have involved first a determination of whether or not
the imported article was waste. If the importation were not waste, a
significantly higher duty was imposed.14 If it were waste, a further
determination was required to classify the article into one of the many
sub-categories of waste.15 The line of cases involved in the Studner
decision arose within this context, beginning in 1895, when the
Supreme Court, in Patton v. United States, synthesized prior
definitions of waste into "refuse, or material that is not susceptible of
being used for ordinary purposes of manufacture."' 6 The Patton court
paragraph 301, for example, "That nothing shall be deemed scrap iron or scrap steel
except second hand or waste or refuse iron or steel fit only to be remanufactured." See
also paragraph 394 (old and worn-outzinc, fit only to be remanufactured); Public Law
81- 869, 64 Stat. 1093, as amended; and items 911.10-911.12, Tariff Schedules of the
United States. The restriction "fit only to be remanufactured" also occurs in earlier tariff
acts. See paragraph 301, Tariff Act of 1922; paragraph 518, Tariff Act of 1913; paragraph
118, Tariff Act of 1909. It would appear, therefore, that when Congress intended to limit
the terms "waste" or "scrap" to merchandise fit only for remanufacture, it so stated.
Studner v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 1394, 1398-99 (Cust. Ct. 1969).
12. Id. at 1400. The majority failed to rebut this statement.
13. Id. at 1402.
14. In the Studner case, for example, had the court decided that the print blocks were not
waste, the duty imposed would have been 19% ad valorem instead of 4% ad valorem. Studner v.
United States, 300 F. Supp. 1394, 1395 (Cust. Ct. 1969).
15. See Harley Co. v. United States, 14 Ct. Cust. App. 112, 113, T.D. 41644 (1926) (the
importer of cotton, wool and silk rags relied on no less than four types of waste).
16. 159 U.S. 500, 503 (1895) (Patton involved a determination of whether an importation was
"wool waste" dutiable at ten cents per pound or as "scoured wool, broken tops ... " dutiable
at sixty cents per pound).
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demanded no absolute worthlessness of the article. It only required that
the article be "unmerchantable and used for purposes for which
merchantable material of the same class is unsuitable."'17
Thirty-one years later in Harley Co. v. United States,." the Customs
Court analyzed waste in terms of an "old waste-new waste"
dichotomy." Harley Company imported rags of cotton, wool and silk
which the Customs Collector classified as "[w]aste not specially
provided for, 10 per centum ad valorem." 2 The importer, objecting,
sought to have the merchandise enter duty free as any one of the four
sub-categories of waste.21 The controversy had therefore passed the
threshold question of whether or not the article was waste; the problem
centered instead upon which classification of waste ought to be applied.
At trial, the importer apparently relied primarily upon proving that the
merchandise was "[jiunk, old. 22 As a result, by looking to prior tariff
definitions of junk,23 the Harley court found that junk traditionally
meant "a manufactured article rendered unsuitable for the purpose for
which it was originally made, which thereby became fit only for
remanufacture and had no value other than that of a manufacturing
material.12' Expanding upon this finding, the court then formulated a
definition of waste to include
manufactured articles which have become useless for the original
purpose for which they were made and fit only for remanufacture into
something else. It also includes refuse, surplus, and useless stuff resulting
17. "'Unmerchantable" when used here must mean unmerchantable for the original purpose
of manufacture, not unmerchantable for any purpose, since the latter interpretation would require
absolute worthlessness of an article before it is classified as waste, an idea the Court expressly
refused to endorse.
18 14 Ct. Cust. App. 112, 115 (1926).
19 See notes 5 to 7, supra, and accompanying text.
20. 14 Ct. Cust. App. 112 (1926).
2 1. "The paragraphs or parts thereof upon which the importer relies are as follows:
PAR 1516. Waste bagging, and waste sugar sack cloth.
PAR 1560. Cotton and cotton waste.
PAR 1601.Junk,old.
PAR 1651. Rag pulp; paper stock, crude, of every description, including all grasses, fibers,
rags, waste, including jute, hemp, and flax waste *** rope ends, waste rope, and waste
bagging, and all other waste not specially provided for, including old gunny cloth, and old
gunny used chiefly for paper making, and no longer suitable for bags."
Id. at 113
22. Id. at 113-114 (the testimony which the court cites in its opinion refers only to the junk
classification).
23. Id. at 115. (The court looked back to the Tariff Acts of 1883, 1890, 1894, 1897, 1909 and
1913).
24. Id
Vol. 1970: 198]
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from manufacture or from manufacturing processes and commercially
unfit, without remanufacture, for the purposes for which the original
material was suitable and from which material such refuse, surplus or
unsought residuum was derived. The latter class of waste might be
appropriately designated as new waste and includes such things as,
tangled spun thread, coal dust, broken or spoiled castings fit only for
remanufacturePu
The court concluded that the importation at issue fell into the old waste
category. Thus, although the Harley court formulated a definition of
waste as a generic term, it had in mind only that specific type of waste
known as "junk, old". Arguably, the Harley definition of waste should
have been confined by the courts in subsequent cases to articles of
"junk, old" since that category is essentially the same as the "old
waste" category of Harley. Instead, the courts applied the definition
indiscriminately to any sub-category of wa'ste2
Although no court following either Patton or Harley has claimed to
have altered the original definition, Customs Courts have utilized the
following approaches to determine waste: (I) stating and applying the
Harley definition to an article to find either "old waste" or "new
waste";27 (2) stating the Harley definition without classifying the article
as either "old waste" or "new waste";28 or, (3) applying the Patton
definition, directly29 or indirectly,30 to determine waste.
But no one approach is consistently followed. The resulting
confusion is epitomized by the trial court's reasoning in Silverman &
Son v. United States.Y In holding that the merchandise was "waste",
25. Id.
26. The majority opinion in Studner exemplifies this indiscriminate application. The court cites
the Harley definition as an "oft-quoted statement," alluding not at all to the particular sub-
category from which the court derived its generic definition of "old waste".
27. United States v. C.J. Tower & Sons, 31 C.C.P.A. 185, 190-91, C.A.D. 271 (1944); United
States v. Katzenstein & Keene, 16 Ct. Cust. App. 93, 97, T.D. 42754 (1928).
28. Studner v. United States, 50 Cust. Ct. 149, C.D. 2404 (1963); Pelton Enterprises, Inc. v.
United States, 44 Cust. Ct. 381, Abs. #63935 (1960); Midwest Waste Material Co. v. United
States, 28 Cust. Ct. 8, 18, C.D. 1382 (1951).
29. National Carloading Corp. v. United States, 22 Cust. Ct. 328, 329 (1949); Cia.
Algondonera v. United States, 23 C.C.P.A. 42 (1935); Willits & Co. v. United States, II Ct. Cust.
App. 499, 500-01, T.D. 39657 (1923).
30. Rachman Bag Co., Inc. v. United States, 57 Cust. Ct. 465 (1966) [cites Patton definition
through T.E. Ash v. United States. 16 Ct. Cust. App. 225 (1928)]; W.R. Grace & Co. v. United
States, 9 Cust. Ct. 59, 62 (1942) (cites Patton definition through Willits & Co., note 20 supra);
Koons, Wilson & Co. v. United States, 12 Ct. Cust. App. 418,419 (1924) (cites Patton definition
through Willits & Co., note 20, supra).
31. 27 C.C.P.A. 324 (1940).
Washington University Open Scholarship
CUSTOMS DUTIES
the court stated the Harley "old waste" definition, slightly reworded,
without attributing it to Harlevy Yet in support of this determination
of waste, the trial court cited Cia. Aigondera v. United States33 and
the cases cited therein. The Cia. Algondera decision relied heavily on
the Patton definition in affirming a finding of waste, while making no
mention whatsoever of the Harley definition.
On their facts, the line of cases involved in the Studner decision
indicates that the basic Harley "old waste"-"new waste" distinction
is generally workable. "Old waste" articles include worn-out wearing
apparel,m worn-out rags, exposed and developed X-ray films,3' woven
strips of jute no longer used in army camoflage nets,31 slit burlap
bags,M worn-out sanforizing blankets,39 and old print blocks. "New
waste" articles include sisal fiber shavings,' 1 cottonseed hulls,4 beet
pulp (the dried residue from sugar beets after extraction of sugar), 3 and
residue from the manufacture of buttons from tagua nuts."
However, changing economic conditions pose a major definitional
difficulty. Anytime a traditional by-product becomes a desired major
end-product, and, through decreased demand, becomes useless for the
original end-product purpose, the possibility of multiple Harley
characterizations and confusion may result!'
The problem stems from the Harley requirement that waste articles
be fit only for remanufacture. Two opinions cited by the Studner
majority demonstrate the judicial tendency to circumvent this
requirement. In Silverman & Sons v. United States, 4  worn-out
sanforizing blankets, no longer fit for their original use in textile
32 Id at 325.
33 23 C C.P.A. 42, T.D. 47686 (1935).
34 Harley Co. v. United States, 14 Ct. Cust. App. 112 (1926).
35 United States v Katzenstein & Keene, 16 Ct. Cust. App. 93, T.D. 42754 (1928).
36 United States v. CJ Tower & Sons, 31 C.C.P.A. 185, C.A.D. 271 (1944).
37 Midwest Waste Material Co. v. United States, 28 Cust. Ct. 8, C.D. 1382 (1951).
38 Rachman Bag Co., Inc. v. United States, 57 Cust. Ct. 465 (1966).
39 P Silverman & Sons v. United States, 27 C.C.P.A. 324 (1940).
40 Studner v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 1394, C.D. 3865 (Cust. Ct. 1969).
41 National Carloading Corp. v. United States, 22 Cust. Ct. 328 (1949).
42 Cia Algondonera v. United States, 23 C.C.P.A. 42 (1935).
43. Koons, Wilson & Co. v. United States, 12 Ct. Cust. App. 418 (1924).
44 W R. Grace & Co. v. United States, 9 Cust. Ct. 59 (1942).
45. See Cia. Algondonera v. United States, 23 C.C.P.A. 42 (1935), where plaintiff-importer
unsuccessfully urged that an article, which was a definite, sought-for major product of a milling
process,- be deemed waste. Id. at 43. The importer in this case wanted duty free importation as
'cotton waste" rather than the -waste, not specially provided for" duty.
46. 27 C C.P.A. 324, C.A.D. 107 (1940).
Vol. 1970: 198]
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finishing operations, were held-to be waste because they were fit for
another use only after "manipulation". The manipulation consisted
solely of cleaning the blanketsA7 In Rachman Bag Co., Inc. v. United
States," burlap bags, slit for removal of their contents prior to
importation and unfit in their imported condition for use as bags, were
held to be waste bagginp when they were fit only for "conversion" into
nursery squares and bale wrappersP
The Studner court, recognizing the unworkability of the strict Harley
dichotomy and using as a foundation prior judicial attempts to
circumvent the rigid categories, could have specifically abolished the
Harley categories0 With the Harley dichotomy eliminated, the old
print blocks would have been classifiable as waste under the Patton
definition, as "not susceptible of being used for the ordinary purposes
of manufacture."51
However, by eliminating only the remanufacturing requirement, the
Customs Court allowed Harley to stand as an elaborative adjunct to
the Supreme Court's general definition of waste set forth in Patton.
The Studner court retains the benefit of a line of precedents which
determined waste under both Patton and Harley, while allowing
retention of both the Patton definition and the modified Harley
categories to aid in future determinations of waste. At the same time,
Studner continues expansion of the waste definition."
47. Id.
48. 57 Cust. Ct. 465, C.D. 2838 (1966).
49. According to a recent decision, a "cleansing treatment, which does not change the
character of the merchandise or appropriate it to any new or different use," may not be
considered a manufacturing process. Woodart Mills v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 381 (Cust.
Ct. 1967). Therefore, although the definition of waste was not squarely presented in Silverman,
the implication remained that no classification of waste required an article to have undergone
remanufacture. Likewise, in Raehman Bag Co., the slit burlap bags were fit only for
"conversion" into nursery squares and bale wrappers which leaves open the possibility that
"conversion", like "cleansing", is not a manufacturing process.
50. Because the Studner facts involve a clear "old waste" article, any pronouncement about
the corresponding "new waste" requirement would be dictum.
51. Patton v. United States, 159 U.S. 500,503 (1895).
52. Perhaps the "logical" approach to and the accompanying expansion of the low-duty waste
category implements long-standing United States policy to encourage importers in the United
States to utilize fully every article, product or by-product cast off by foreign businessmen.
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